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TORTS-LIABILITY OF RESCUED DEFENDANT WHo CARELESSLY

Ex-

POSES HIMSELF TO DANGER TO RESCUING PLAINTIFF WHO IS INJURED-

While visiting defendant's farm, plaintiff was injured pushing defendant from
the path of her own automobile which. she had stopped on an incline without
setting the brake. Held, for plaintiff. Lack of self-protective care may be
negligence toward any person in whose vicinity one exposes oneself to undue
risk of injury. Carney v. Buyea, 271 App. Div. 338, 65 N.Y.S. (2d) 902

(r946).
A rescuer injured in a reasonable attempt to aid a third person exposed to
danger by the negligence of defendant may recover. 1 _It does not ·amount to
contributory negligence to risk life or serious injury in a reasonable attempt to
effect a rescue,2 and the cause of the injury to the rescuer is the negligence of
di;fendant who caused the peril. 8 Courts have had more difficulty with the few

1 3$ AM. JuR., Negligence, § 80, pp. 738-739; Wagner v. International Railway
Co., 232 N.Y. 176, 133 N.E. 437 (1921), 19 A.L.R. 1 at 4' (1922); Tarnow v.
Hudson & M. R. Co., 120 N.J.L. 505, 1 A. (2d) 73 (1938).
2 2 ToRTS RESTATEMENT, § 472 (1934); Bernardine v. New York, 268 App.
Div. 444, 51 N.Y.S. (2d) 888 (1944); Wolfinger v. Shaw, 138 Neb. 229, 292 N.W.
731 (1940); Corrie v. Hollaran, 51 Ga. App. 910, 181 S.E. 709 (1935).
8 PROSSER, LAW OF ToRTs 358-360 (1941); Wagner v. International Railway
Co., 232 N.Y. 176, 133 N.E. 437 (1921), 19 A.L.R. 1 at 4 (1922); Guille v. Swan,
19 Johns. (N.Y.) 381 (1822); Duff v. Bemidji Motor Service Co., 210 Minn. 456,
299 N.W. 196 (1941). See also 166 A.L.R. 752 (1947) on causation in accident
anfl injury cases.
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RECENT DECISIONS

rescue cases like the principal case in which defendant's action exposes himself
rather than a third person to danger. The chief problem in this connection has
been one of duty. A leading case in the field, Saylor v. Parsons,4 held in 1904
that a plaintiff injured while preventing a brick wall from falling on the defendant who hac;l not exercised care for his own safety in undermining it with
a crowbar could not recover. The court indicated that a rescuing plaintiff's
rights were derived from the rights of the person rescued unless defendant had
been negligent toward plaintiff after the start of the attempted rescue. 5 In
1932 the New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals 6 held a defendant, whose
driver had driven recklessly on an icy pavement and skidded into an electric
light pole, breaking the pole and causing the wires to fall, liable to a plaintiff
injured by contact with the wires in going to aid the driver trapped beneath
the truck. However, the court did not treat the case as a rescue case because
the situation did not involve obvious danger to the rescuing party, but based
liability on danger to users of the highway in general caused by knocking the
pole down. The Saylor case was followed in 1943 by a Canadian court denying recovery in Dupuis v. New Regina Trading Co., Ltd.,1 where defendant's
elevator operator, through her own negligence in failing to close the elevator
door before starting, had become suspended head down in the elevator shaft and
Dupuis was killed when he fell down the shaft attempting to rescue her. On the
other hand, in I 944 the Michigan Supreme Court in Brugh v. Bigelow 8 held
that a plaintiff injured while attempting to aid a defendant pinned beneath the
wheel of defendant's car after an accident caused by his own negligence might
recover on the theory that defendant by carelessness for his own safety created
a dangerous situation in which it was likely that a bystander might be induced
to rescue him and be injured. The Michigan court 9 as well as the New York
court in the principal case 10 rejected the argument, based on the theory of the
Saylor case, that defendant could not be liable since plaintiff's rights were derived from those of the rescued person and the rescued person here could have
no right because defendant could not be legally negligent toward himself.
These two recent cases may indicate a shift in the court's thinking toward the ·
122 Iowa 679, 98 N.W. 500 (1904), 64 L.R.A. 542 (1904).
Id. at 681, "But negligence on the part of the defendant either toward the
person rescued or the party making the rescue after the attempt has been begun is
essential to a recovery in all cases."
6 Butler v. Jersey Coast News Co., I09 N.J.L. 255, 160 A. 659 (1932).
1 [1943] 4 D.L.R. 275; reviewed in 21 CAN. B. REv. 758 (1943).
8 3IO Mich. 74, 16 N.W. (2d) 668 (1944), 158 A.L.R. 184 at 189 (1945).
The case is discussed in 25 MxcH. B. J. 251 at 337 (1946), 43 MxcH. L. REv. 980
(1945), and IO Mo. L. REv. 321 (1945).
9 3 IO Mich. 74 at 8 I, "Defendant's claim that he owed himself and his
rescuer no duty is without merit. His cries for help belied his claimed freedom from
duty. Defendant further argues that rescue is unusual and that it is an unusual thing
and therefore not to be anticipated that passers-by would respond to relieve known clire
necessity resulting from an automobile accident. We understand the contrary to be the
case."
10 65 N.Y.S. (2d) 902 at 908, "In parking her car as she did, the defendant en-·
dangered the safety not only of the bystanders on her farm, but also the safety of
herself..•."
4

5
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view, as Professor Bohlen put it, criticizing the Saylor case,11 that "the rescuer's
right of action therefore must rest upon the view that one who imperils another
at a place where there may be bystanders must take into account the chance
that some bystander will yield to the meritorious impulse to· save life or even
property from destruction, and attempt a rescue. If this is so, the right of action depends not on the wrongfulness of defendant's conduct in its tendency to
impe,ril the person whose rescue is attempted, but upon its tendency to cause the
rescuer to take the risk involved in the attempted rescue. And it would seem
that a person who carelessly exposes himself to danger or who attempts to take
his life in a ·place where others may be expected to be, does commit a. wrongful
act towards them in that it exposes them to recognizable risk of injury." Although the justices in the Saylor case felt that the possibility of attempted rescue
was so remote that it was not foreseeable, 12 the many rescue cases in the courts
today point to the opposite conclusion, and, therefore, the change evidenced by
the· principal case would seem desirable and more in keeping with modern
theories of duty in negligence cases.

Edwin M. Deal, S.Ed.

11 STUDIEs IN THE LAW OF ToRTS, note 33, 568 at 569 (1926). In support
of this theory see King, "Some Memorabilia of Michigan Law, 1940-45," 25 MrcH.
B. J. 251 at 337 (1946).
12 l 22 Iowa 679 at 684, "The instincts of self preservation stilt so dominates human conduct that acts like that under consideration, in which life itself was risked for
the protection of another, are of such rare occurrence as always to commend the special
attention and admiration of the entire community, and by the common voice of mankind those who do them are singled out as worthy of enrollment on the scroll of
heroes. J3ecause of their infrequency, however, it cannot be said they should enter into
the calculations of men as at all likely in the ordinary transactions of life. As they
spring from magnanimity, magnanimity must be relied upon in cases like this for
reparation."
·

